Publisher: BACM Research
Size: 75.37 MB
Languages : en
The author fanaticized about combat and played war games in his youth. War is not a game. Combat wasn't this fantasy for him in real life. This book tells the story of a Kansas boy who grew up quickly serving as a combat platoon leader in the Vietnam War. It shares his exploits with A Company, 4/503, 173 Airborne Brigade. His platoon was very unlucky in the June/November 1967 campaign as the "Fire Brigade" took on the NVA in Dak To. His actions are reported in at least two documentary books dealing with individual firefights in the Central Highlands during that period. This is the unpolished truth about the brutal war and how really futile it was to go toe to toe against a better-prepared army and survive. The author gives unembellished reports of what his unit experienced and backs it up with the Battalion After Action Reports. He acknowledges he is alive today only because of superior tactical air support and artillery firepower. This book gives an entirely different viewpoint than most books authored by Vietnam veterans. While his observations may be controversial to some vets, it reflects the author's objective opinion of what he experienced there.
Examines the January 1963 Battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War.
Historiske, krigsvidenskabelige betragtninger fra tiden før 1914.
The Army has recently embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. We are simultaneously engaged in a huge effort to learn how to conduct those missions for which we do not consistently prepare. Mr. Robert Ramsey's historical study examines three cases where the US Army has performed this same mission in the last half of the 20th century. In Korea during the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and in El Salvador in the 1980s the Army was tasked to build and advise host nation armies during a time of war. The author makes several key arguments about the lessons the Army thought it learned at the time.Among the key points Mr. Ramsey makes are the need for US advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt US organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. Accordingly, he also notes the great importance of the host nation's leadership buying into and actively supporting the development of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system. To its credit, the institutional Army learned these hard lessons, from successes and failures, during and after each of the cases examined in this study. However, they were often forgotten as the Army prepared for the next major conventional conflict.